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REPORT

ANTI-DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES
James P. Stuckey*
INTRODUCTION

In the 19th century, America's Manifest Destiny was to conquer the open spaces of the west and develop the nation from ocean
to ocean. Since its birth, America has always been a nation deeply
centered around growth of all types-economic, social, and political.
Americans, unique among the peoples of the world, have always
been driven by an ethic of growth, a view that expansion is not only
beneficial, but positively necessary. The nation has grown fiercely
and quickly by expanding across and filling up a continent with unheard of rapidity, and continually finding new places and new ways
to grow.
As it has been for some time, our Manifest Destiny is virtually
complete. Our continent is filled, our cities and states populated, our
open spaces increasingly shrunken and diminished. In fulfilling its
destiny, the United States has experienced exceptional and sustained
prosperity. But like all good things, this prosperity has come at a
cost. In the 1980's, amidst another economic boom, Americans are
starting to feel that perhaps we have grown too much. A sort of reversed Manifest Destiny is setting in-a mood that growth is no
* B.S., M.A., St. John's University. Mr. Stuckey is President of the New York City Public Development Corporation, the lead agency for commercial, industrial, and waterfront economic initiatives and development.
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longer beneficial but is rather hazardous and threatening. Citizens
facing severe traffic congestion, an increasingly polluted environment, and cities that are more and more overburdened as well as
overcrowded, are learning to voice legitimate and coherent concerns
about the pace of development. As the Urban Land Institute recently reported: "Once welcomed as a harbingger of economic and
cultural well-being, new development is now viewed in many communities with caution and sometimes suspicion." 1 With the growing
resentment of growth has come the inevitable reaction: cities and
counties throughout the country are placing serious blockades in the
way of future growth, in a variety of new and untried ways. Antidevelopment initiatives and anti-development sentiment are surfacing everywhere. Along with this national perception that growth is
harmful, further development is facing new and more challenging
threats from the traditional forces which have always worked against
it.
Even advocates of growth are forced to consider the concerns
expressed by these traditional forces which argue legitimately
against the evils of overbuilding and the threats of a strained infrastructure and polluted environments. It would be short-sighted for
development entities such as the Public Development Corporation
(PDC) to ignore an issue as real as anti-growth sentiments. As advocates of sensible growth, we must be committed to addressing the
concerns and providing creative and workable solutions.
In examining the results of nationwide rapid growth, we see a
national development climate in which efforts toward future economic growth are becoming increasingly difficult, time consuming,
and expensive. The characteristics of the anti-development forces are
varied and complex, and their roots stem from a wide range of areas.
The costs of anti-development initiatives are great, but as of yet unfelt. One thing is sure: the revolt against development in the United
States is a widespread phenomenon. A general survey by Population
Environment Balance, Inc. lends support to this proposition. It examined 1,650 communities across the country, and found that one in
five communities had instituted some sort of land use controls.2
Many of these communities also indicated that they planned on instituting growth-management strategies soon. These anti-growth
1988 13 (1988) (hereinafter DEVEL1988).
2. Rose, California Towns Vote to Restrict Expansion as Services Lag Behind, Wall St.
J., November 27, 1987, at I.
1.
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trends are not small or isolated problems.
The anti-development forces, some new and some newly resurgent, threaten future growth and pose a deep challenge to organizations like PDC who are directed to encourage and foster development. This report will examine the traditional slow-growth forces
and their changing affects on the development climate. More importantly, it will examine the new anti-development forces sweeping the
nation: the economic and social costs of these initiatives, their
sources, future trends, as well as possible solutions. It is hoped that a
better understanding of the forces in opposition to growth will better
allow PDC and other groups to fulfill their important and aggressive
development mandates.
I.

TRADITIONAL GROWTH-MANAGEMENT

AND ITS CONTINUED

STRENGTH

A growth-management agenda of some strength has always existed in the United States. Traditionally, specific interest groups utilized established practices to pursue their claims against specific
types of growth or to regulate the growth of certain areas. Development in America has never occurred in an entirely unlimited market;
nor would such growth be beneficial. Preservationists, environmental
interest groups, and zoning laws have all acted to guide and control
growth. These are not anti-growth initiatives per se, because they are
positive movements which ensure that growth is managed in a rational manner that ensures minimal adverse impact on valid social
goals and aspirations. Development that destroys the nation's historic
heritage or natural habitat is clearly unwelcome, and has not been
allowed by this traditional type of growth-management initiative.
What is new in the 1980's are those forms of activism which act
more aggressively, in new and expanded ways, to prevent more future growth. These, and the problems they represent must be duly
noted.
A.

Historic Preservation

Historic preservation remains a potent issue, and it continues to
prevent development in areas which, for historic or other interests,
demand to be preserved. In Atlanta, preservationists are battling
with developers over demolishing old buildings with frontage on
downtown Peachtree Street. Here in New York, proposed revisions
in the methodology of the Landmarks Commission are causing controversy. Clearly, historic preservation will remain an important fac-
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tor in limiting future growth in designated areas. It is also clear that
this is a growth-slowing factor justifiably supported by most members of the general community, including development advocacy
groups like the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY). REBNY
fully supports the concept of historic preservation in New York; yet
it is working to change some policies it perceives as particularly detrimental to developers.
B.

Environmental Preservation

Environmental issues have always worked to hinder development by imposing complicated design standards, restricting development in designated areas, demanding expensive mitigation procedures, and the like. Today, these environmental issues continue to
hinder development with a wider agenda and tougher strategies. In
this way they continue to contribute to the current slow-growth atmosphere for developers.
The preservation of natural wetlands is a growing concern in
areas where wetlands form a large percentage of the available land.
Coupled with the fact that marshy, coastal land is often the only
space left for large scale development of all kinds, this new concern
is serving to close off large amounts of potential development. The
Urban Land Institute Development Trends 1988 report points to this
fact: "Wetlands are coming into their own. They are no longer regarded as simply noisome breeding grounds for mosquitos. With this
greater appreciation of wetlands has come greater conflict over their
use."' The availability of inland properties in New York has resulted
in relatively little focus on the wetlands issue, yet many other states
are enacting laws to protect wetlands from development. New
Jersey's 1987 law classifies wetlands by their value as natural areas,
and restricts development in various ways according to this classification." In Orlando, Florida, development has been dramatically curtailed because of wetlands issues. Virtually the only remaining vacant land in that area is wetlands, and because these have been
protected by legislation, building on them is difficult or impossible.
The wetlands issue will continue to restrict growth, especially as developers turn to these marginal areas when other lands become more
scarce.
A mounting concern over toxic wastes and toxic building mater3. DEVELOPMENT
4. Id.
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ials is making development more expensive and land acquisition
more risky, thus working to slow growth. Asbestos is a critical issue,
especially in New York. As of April 1, 1987, no building in the city
can receive a permit for alterations unless it is inspected for asbestos.
If the substance is found an abatement plan must be agreed upon.
Since the cost of removal is very high, at $10 to $30 per square foot,
the renovation of older buildings-an important infill procedure in
5
space-starved New York-may become economically unfeasible.
Asbestos is not the only material whose required removal makes
development more costly and difficult. The federal Superfund Act of
1980,6 and to a slightly lesser degree its 1986 equivalent, 7 holds past
and present owners of toxic waste sites liable for their
cleanup-whether they polluted them or not.8 In New Jersey, the
Environmental Clean up Responsibility Act 9 of 1983 requires the removal of toxic wastes and the testing of all land before construction
begins. The risks, expense, and costs of delay which these acts bring
to developers all work to make development harder. PDC has experienced the difficulties of toxic removal and testing directly: The Air
Cargo Park is in the midst of toxicity testing which, according to the
Industrial Development Strategy report, "in the worse case could
prevent its cost-effective development."'"
Environmental concerns are also expanding into new, previously
ignored areas, working to slow development further. Acquifiers-underground water supplies-are increasingly coming
under the attention of environmental groups and the federal government as targets of possible pollution. In San Antonio, city leaders
are considering a moratorium on development over their acquifier, a
measure which development interest groups (who have taken voluntary mitigation precautions) are fighting fiercely." San Antonio worries that because of its sheer lack of knowledge about its acquifier, it
is inadvertently harming it. 2 As many cities depend on underground
5. Guenther, New York Builders See Woes in New Asbestos Cleanup Law, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 25, 1987, at 33.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
7. Superfund Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §1, 100 Stat. 1613.
8. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS 1988, supra note 1,at 18-19.
9. 1983 N.J. Laws ch. 330 (West).
10. NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT CORP., INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY REPORT 115 (1988) (hereinafter INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY REPORT).
11. Celis, Building Atop Water Supplies Raising Safety Issues in Cities, Wall St. J.,
June 24, 1987, at 29.
12. Id.
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water supplies, protection measures for this newly-considered resource could slow development nationwide.
C.

Zoning

Like historic preservation and environmental pressures, zoning
laws have traditionally worked to manage growth. Today, zoning is
being used in a way that further hinders further development. A
more complex use of zoning is to be expected from communities concerned with quality of life issues.13 For example, cities are now
utilizing zoning laws to protect the views of natural scenery from
downtown areas. Denver recently won a lengthy court battle to preserve its right to zone against a building that would have obscured
the city's view of the Rockies. 4 Texas and Seattle are also both enacting zoning laws to ensure that the beauty of their outlaying areas
can be seen. 15 Zoning, an old form of development control, is now
being used in even more sophisticated ways to slow future growth.
D.

Land Costs

Another previously unfaced problem is cropping up for developers. In the past, land was merely costly; now, it is nearly impossible
to obtain at all. The problem is particularly acute here in New York.
According to the Industrial Development Strategy report,
"there is not enough city-owned property for the city to effectuate a
strategy of retaining businesses in New York by offering available
sites in the outer boroughs. Although PDC is in the process of creating new industrial space, this is not nearly sufficient to meet the perceived demand."'" At the risk of oversimplification, it is easy to say
that real estate development is impossible without the land to put it
on, or that growth is impossible without the space to locate businesses in-yet both are of course true. The lack of space within the
city forces PDC and private developers either to focus on more marginal sites where the cost of development is greater, or to examine
sites which require the condemnation or dislocation of existing residents and businesses. This increases the social costs of growth.
Scarce and expensive available land is an on-going problem for de13.

Wofford, Significant Trends Affecting Office and Industrial Real Estate, 1987 THE
94, 102.
14. Celis, More Cities Pass Zoning Laws To Keep Local Sights in View, Wall St. J.,
July 22, 1987, at 23.
15. Id.
16. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 10, at 106.
APPRAISAL J.
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velopers and it is another factor of growing potency that works to
slow development.

1I. NEW

FORMS OF ANTI-DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

So far this report has examined the old forms of slow-growth
devices which have recently been operating with increased vitality:
preservationism, environmentalism, zoning, and land scarcity. These,
however, do not entirely characterize the anti-development climate
existing today. There exists today a powerful slow-growth agenda is
dominated by a new form of anti-development initiative: a bi-partisan, massively popular, widely supported, and largely suburban
movement by citizens angry at growth and ready to stop it. The people working against growth are no longer just environmentalists, but
representatives of many interest groups and organizations: Republicans, Democrats, business and government leaders. They are largely
middle class and are fighting growth not as an abstract idea, but as
an invidious force which they feel attacks their lives and harms them
personally. The anti-growth movement today is a popular and grassroots movement. The target is not the federal government, nor even
so much the states, but rather the municipality which feels the pressure and grants anti-development laws. The groups are formidable
opponents for developers, and have been extremely successful across
the nation. The result of their success is a whole range of specific
slow-growth measures, which together form the backbone of today's
anti-development climate. The result, too, is what Andrew Reinbach
in Barron's calls a "new game" for real estate developers, "characterized by design controls, restrictive zoning, linkage to social or in17
frastructure goals and a general scaling down of future growth.1
A.

Exactment Fees

The first and most significant anti-development initiative arising
out of the new organized antipathy to growth is the exactment or
impact fee. These fees are variously called linkage programs,
proofers, abatements, or, as Anthony Downs in Buildings states,
"just plain extortions."' 8 In a 1985 survey by the National Home
Builders Association, almost 58 percent of the communities questioned reported that they used exactment fees of one form or an17. Reinbach, Cities Clamp Tough Rules on Downtown Builders, Barron's, Dec. 2,
1985, at 81.
18. Downs, Commercial Real Estate Forecast 1988, BUILDINGS, Jan., 1988, at 54, 56.
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other. 19 The fees take the form of give-backs by a developer in return for municipal permission to proceed with development. A
developer may be required to improve the public infrastructure surrounding his site, contribute money to specific city programs, or invest in less attractive areas in need of further development. The implementation of exactment fees, notes Larry Wofford in The
Appraisal Journal, stems from government concern "about the cost
of providing necessary services to real estate development and the
problems created by development. "2 0 New development strains infrastructure and often has negative environmental impact.
By forcing a developer to mitigate the public costs of construction plans, the exactment fees offer a politically palatable alternative
to an increase in local taxes. 2 Often, however, the use of impact fees
is unsystematized, resulting in a situation where developers must engage in horsetrading with municipalities to get approval for projects.
Los Angeles' new $23 million art museum was won as a concession
from developers who wished to build a $1.9 billion office complex.2 2
San Antonio approved construction of a new Hyatt Hotel only on the
condition that the developers provided favorable terms for a group of
hispanic investors to buy into the project.2" The lack of predictability
in the development process stemming from case-by-case negotiating
is often enough in itself to drive new investment away.
The use of impact fees is popular in cities both large and small.
Smaller communities usually assess impact fees for home building.
Loveland Colorado, for instance, charges a "buy-in fee" of $7,800
per new home built.24 Towns across the country are beginning to
charge for emergency medical services, parks, and even for the new
space required in city halls to administer for a growing population.2 5
In many large cities, the municipality charges a specific dollar
amount per square foot of developed space. The money is then
targeted for various programs. The formalization of fees has often
19. Schmidt, Developers Paying New Fees for Public Services, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1985, at AI8.
20. Wofford, supra note 13, at 101.
21. Thomason, Suburban Sprawl: How Counties Cope, AMERICAN CITY & COUNTY,
July 1986, at 56.
22. Waldman, Cities Are Pressured To Make Developers Share Their Wealth, Wall St.
J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 1.
23. Id.
24. Towns and Cities Charge Developers More to Cover the Cost of Growth, Wall St.
J., Oct. 2, 1986, at I [hereinafter Towns].
25. Id.
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brought with it an expansion of their scope. Cities that in the past
charged simply for sewer improvements now also assess fees for day
26
care programs, cultural events, and similar programs.
Examples of large cities with formalized linkage programs
abound. Urged on by voter pressure, Hartford, Seattle, and Chicago
are all strongly considering a policy of forcing exactments from developers.17 Chicago's proposal consists of levying a fee of $5 per
square foot of space in buildings exceeding 100,000 square feet, dividing the revenues collected among the city's seventy-seven wards,
and allowing the voters of each ward to decide what to do with their
share of the money. 8 Boston's impact fee requires. developers to pay
$6 a square foot on buildings over 100,000 square feet." Payments
can be spread out for seven years and must begin on the first day of
construction. In addition, Boston requires that developers hire Boston residents, and encourages the employment of minority groups.
The city also operates a "Parcel to Parcel" linkage program,
whereby it provides developers choice parcels of downtown land in
exchange for their development of land in underdeveloped neighborhoods. 1 Lastly, Boston has implemented a strict downtown growth
control plan called the Interim Planning Overlay District (IPOD).
This limits the height of new building to 300 feet until 1989, and
closes off all but three percent of the downtown area from future
development." While not an exactment fee, IPOD is an important
part of Boston's overall anti-development legislation.
Boston's assessment of an impact fee is an attempt by the city
to alleviate what Brook Larmar in The Christian Science Monitor
calls the "paradox of growth." 33 Even though the downtown boom
has brought large amounts of new investment into Boston, it remains
a city with great pockets of poverty (20.2 percent of its citizens were
below the poverty level in 1980)."' With the money from the exactment fees, Mayor Flynn hopes to create a job training program for
26. Towns, supra note 24, at I.
27. Waldman, supra note 22, at 1.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Larmar, Boston Tightens Rules That Get Developers To Help Pay For Solving Urban Problems, Chris. Sci. Mon., Dec. 9, 1985, at 5.
30. Id.
31. Brown, Boston, in CITIES REBORN 14, 27 (R. Levitt ed. 1987).
32. Megathlin, Boston: A Commentary, in CITIES REBORN 11, 13 (R. Levitt ed. 1987).
33. Larmar, supra note 29, at 6.
34. Economou, Pittsburgh, in CITIES REBORN 110, 122 (R. Levitt ed. 1987).
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those persons passed over by the economic expansion.3 5 Although developers have largely accepted the program as the cost of doing business in Boston, it is the kind of initiative many of them resent. They
persuasively argue that recent development is not the cause of Boston's housing and employment ills, and that the development community should not be singled out to shoulder the burden. 6 Further,
they argue that exactment fees are symbolic gestures designed to
mollify certain activist groups, and thus developers should not be
made to pay them, since they cannot solve the problems they are
designed to address. Exactment fees cannot work, notes Anthony
Downs in Buildings, "since they cannot gain enough scale to come
anywhere close to solving the problems to which they are aimed.""1
While the objections of the development community are noteworthy,
the use of impact fees by Boston and other communities will continue, and remains a strong disincentive to further development due
to the cost and bureaucratic delay it imposes upon developers.
B.

Moratoria, Legal Restrictions, and Voter Initiatives

The second type of anti-development initiative, stemming out of
the new popular resistence to growth, is the ballot measure or other
legal device, whereby voters pressure municipalities into enacting
moratoria or legal restrictions on further development. These restrict
development outright, rather than providing financial disincentives,
as with the exactment fee. Boston's IPOD, taken separately from its
linkage requirements, is such a program. Another example is when
"NIMBY" ("Not in My Back Yard") groups pressure governments
to halt projects through legislative decree and local law. The wide
range of anti-development initiatives of this type are all local plans
to legally restrict development by outlawing or controlling it. Like
exactments, these sorts of legal restrictions are widespread. It is interesting to note that 43 percent of the participants at the 1987 Urban Land Institute meeting in Los Angeles reported moratoria in the
areas where they invested. In the widest sense, the initiatives indicate a trend "for a developer's plans to be subject to 'discretionary
approval' by local government." 38
The impetus for legal restrictions on growth comes directly from
35.
36.
37.
38.

Larmar, supra note 29, at 6.
Id.
Downs, supra note 18, at 56.
Laws Limit Developers, INDUSTRY WEEK, January 26, 1987, at 25.
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citizen groups opposed to development, mostly in suburban areas.3 9
According to Larry Wofford, writing in The Appraisal Journal,
"[m]uch of the interest in land use controls stems from citizen
awareness of the effects of new projects and a realization that
projects can be stalled or prevented by citizen action."'4° The easiest
way for voters to use their power against development interests is for
them to throw out of office those public officials sympathetic to
growth. In 1987, Los Angeles voters replaced the pro-development
City Council president with an unknown who supported sharp antigrowth restrictions. Disaffected voters have also put the Mayor of
Los Angeles, Tom Bradley, in political jeopardy. Usually sympathetic to growth, Bradley has had to alter his stance on the development issue to appease his detractors. 41 Besides threatening politicians, anti-development advocates argue for moratoria or downzoning of growth. Citizens either pressure governments directly to
enact these measures or propose them through ballot initiatives. The
latter is a popular tool in California, where ballots are easy to put
before voters.42 It is also an effective one-fifteen of the seventeen
no-growth measures put to California voters in 1987 were
approved.43
There are many examples of moratoria imposed by voters. To
date, they are largely a suburban phenomena, for it is in the outskirts of cities where resistance to development is often strongest.
However, many feel the future will find this controlling tactic closer
to our inner cities. 44 Many California towns have imposed moratoria
of one form or another: places like Oceanside, Tiburon, Palo Alto,
and Mill Valley all have them. 45 Legal restrictions are prevalent in
cities, too. Santa Monica, Seattle, and Minneapolis all have restrictive city plans.4 Even staid industrial cities in the northeast, like
Worchester, Massachusetts, are imposing moratoria in their outlying
districts. 47 But perhaps the two most dramatic examples of municipal moratoria on growth are in San Diego and Los Angeles. San
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
col. 1.

Rose, supra note 2, at 1.
Wofford, supra note 13, at 101.
See Rose, supra note 2, at 1.
Hull, Not In My Neighborhood, TIME, Jan. 25, 1988, at 24, 25.
Rose, supra note 2, at 1.
See Downs, supra note 18, at 54, 56.
Schreiner, Putting on the Brakes, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan. 1988, at 54.
Reinbach, supra note 17, at 81.
Worcester Acts to Curb Boom Along Outskirts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, at 42,
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Diego voters have given themselves the right to approve each and
every new construction project within the city.4 8 In addition, San Diego has become the largest city in the country to attempt to limit its
own population. Spurned on by a deteriorating quality of life, the
San Diego City Council in 1987 voted to limit new housing starts to
only 8,000 units a year. That represents about one half of the new
homes built in San Diego in 1986."1
In November 1986, Los Angeles voters, by more than two to
one, passed into law Proposition U. This growth restriction halves
the maximum building density on 85 percent of the city's available
commercial and industrial land.5" Previously, developers could put
up buildings at densities of three times the square footage of the lot.
Now, they can build at densities only 1.5 times the square footage.
This is not all that Los Angeles is doing to control growth. Los Angeles county schools levy an exactment fee of $1.50 per square foot
of residential space and twenty-five cents per square foot of commercial and industrial space, to help fund new school facilities.5 1
Los Angeles also faces a new sort of slow-growth initiative,
called the Interim Control Ordinance. This is, in effect, a partial
moratorium, and prohibits only certain kinds of building rather than
stopping construction altogether. The city has twenty-seven such ordinances, with at least twelve others in the approval process. The
ordinances are an easy way for neighborhoods to stop development
they do not like until permanent zoning changes can be put into effect. Like other California cities, Los Angeles is creating a difficult
and expensive climate for developers wishing to see new growth.
C.

San Fransisco's Growth Controls

Of all cities, however, San Francisco, is best known for its
growth controls and anti-development sentiment. It has set in place a
wide range of restrictive measures, including moratoria and exactments of such scope and severity that are halting virtually all development within the city. The first city to use the exactments and legal
restrictions, which have become models for other municipalities, San
Francisco has also come up with the most creative and extensive use
48. Rose, supra note 2, at 1.
49. Lindsey, San Diego Works to Curb Its Sunny Growth, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1987,
at 20.
50. Workshop Focuses on Restrictions in West Coast Cities, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR, Dec., 1987, at 37 [hereinafter Workshop].
51.
Laws Limit Developers, supra note 38, at 25.
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of growth control measures, and has used them more restrictively
than any other city in the nation. The consequences for San Francisco will be correspondingly severe.
San Francisco pioneered the use of impact fees. In 1981, it first
assessed an exactment from developers of office buildings over
50,000 square feet of $5.34 per square foot of new space, to fund a
city program that assists first time home buyers.5 2 It has collected
from developers over $24 million in the last five years of this program. 53 Also in 1981, the city assessed an additional fee of $5 per
square foot to go .to improvements in the city's public transit system.
In 1986, it added additional linkage exactions totalling $6 per square
foot for public art, open space, and child care. 54 The total bill to
developers amounts to $16.34 per square foot--clearly a substantial
disincentive for further development.
But the real strength behind San Francisco's anti-development
agenda is its "Downtown Plan of 1985," and further restrictions voters have placed on top of this already severe measure. The plan,
writes Cheryl Sullivan in The Christian Science Monitor, "was intended to strike a balance between high-rise development and quality
of life." '55 It appears rather to be seriously lopsided and biased
against future development. The downtown plan lays strict groundrules on architecture, wind, and sunlight patterns. It puts an annual
cap of 900,000 square feet on new development in the downtown
area until 1989, restricts any future development to an area south of
Market Street, and requires developers to supply lists of all employees broken down into racial, economic, and age categories."6 This is
all in addition to the exactment fees already mentioned. 57 San Francisco voters, unappeased even by the limits set by the plan, went
further and enacted Proposition M. This ballot measure further
reduces the total square footage of allowable development to 475,000
square feet per year (one medium-sized office building).5 8 Moreover,
it applies added restrictions to smaller buildings than those originally
covered in the plan, and makes the restrictions on building develop52. Waldman, supra note 22, at 1.
53. Larmar, supra note 29, at 6.
54. Waldman, supra note 22, at 1.
55. Sullivan, San Francisco Downtown Plan Gets Bad Reviews, Chris. Sci. Mon., Sept.
29, 1986, at 8.
56. Reinbach, supra note 17, at 81.
57. Id.
58. Guenther, California Initiatives Dampen Outlook for Building Projects, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 24, 1986, at 11.
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ment permanent.59
The results for developers so far have been dramatic. Building
construction has, of course, slowed considerably, but the process by
which buildings can be approved has also become absurdly complex.
Because the city council must now approve all new construction
projects, developers have accused the system of becoming a "beauty
pageant." For example, three buildings came up in 1986 in competition for the available space. Since the city council has so little space
to allocate, it has become extremely careful about what it approves.
The result was that all three projects were rejected. The city ruled
that the available space could be carried over in the next year, so
that 950,000 square feet were available for 1987. Three out of five
projects that competed for this space were approved.6 0 The first developer to hurdle this torturous approval scheme was Michael D.
Barker, who won approval in September 1987 for a 500,000-squarefoot office tower. Barker estimates that in Houston, the design costs
for his project would have amounted to $100,000. In San Francisco,
his tower went through six redesigns and four different tops before it
was finally approved. The price: $1.2 million in design and $4 million
in carrying costs, over fifty times the cost of developing in a city like
Houston without strict controls."1 Clearly, this is a profound and
dramatic disincentive for future developers to seek projects in the
San Francisco area.
Barker asserts that San Francisco's design controls are strict to
the point of being "oblivious to the economics of development. 61 2 It
is difficult to disagree with such a statement, especially in a city
which competes with Los Angeles for its share of commercial and
financial markets. Barker adds: "To me, it sends the worst message
to business: We'd just as soon you go to Los Angeles."'6 3 These concerns are real and necessary for San Francisco's executives and planners. San Francisco (a city which has on the average absorbed 1.5
million square feet of office space a year, and is now limited to a
mere 475,000) has begun to feel the pinch of its adopted anti-development position. 6 4 The city is experiencing a $180 million budget
59.
Nov. 15,
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
J., Mar.

Lindsey, California Voters Calling Holt to Uncontrolled City Growth, N.Y. Times,
1986, at I.
Workshop, supra note 50, at 37.
Reinbach, supra note 17, at 81.
Id.
Guenther, supra note 58, at II.
Guenther, San Francisco's Growth Curb: But Will Other Cities Follow?, Wall St.
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shortfall in the present fiscal year, which represents twenty percent
of its general fund. Although it is too early to tell for sure, some
argue that the reduced tax revenue stemming from San Fransisco's
anti-development and anti-business climate is the cause of the operating deficit, which must be balanced by local law. The present glut
of offices on the San Francisco market which has made this potentially harmful plan feasible was caused by the same spate of overbuilding that initially promoted this city to enact the plan. The city's
office vacancy rate was 13 percent in 1986, and has since climbed
further. It was at 0.1 percent in 1981. The glut, at current absorption rates, may take 6 to 7 years to clear off. It made acceptance of
San Francisco's anti-development policies relatively easy, since little
new development would have occurred anyway. Developers, however,
blame talk of implementing the downtown restrictions as causing the
over-supply in the first place-there was such fear in the development community about the impending restrictions, they say, that
they put anything in the ground just to beat the deadline. 5 When
the office glut finally does wear down, San Francisco will find itself
with a growth policy that is economically withering and clearly unworkable. The budget crisis, already perilous to the city's fiscal
health, will only get worse as the corporate exodus worsens and further erodes the tax base. The costs of its strong anti-growth attitude
will then become painfully obvious.
III.

COSTS OF ANTI-DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

In reviewing the plethora of old and new slow growth devices
currently operating across the country, several things become clear.
The severity of San Francisco's program indicates the potential costs
of the adoption of these programs for the communities which have
embraced them. The costs of an anti-development climate, especially
for a nation which has cherished and continually renewed its commitment to growth, are great and widespread. These issues will now
be examined in greater detail-but it is clear from the outset that
America will not avoid paying for its currently fashionable rejection
of growth.
A.

Inflation and Unemployment

The various anti-development devices, by charging developers,
by imposing legal restrictions, and by making the approval process
65.
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more costly and lengthy, affect the development industry in one basic
way: they result in "higher costs and reduced construction of residential, commercial, industrial and research facilities." 6 The consequent effects of increased price and reduced supply on regional economies can be serious. According to San Diego's Construction
Industry Federation, the 50 percent reduction in housing production
forced by the recent moratorium will not only seriously reduce jobs
in the construction industry, but will also have a ripple effect
throughout the rest of the economy. For every job lost in construction, three or four will be lost elsewhere in the community.6" The
ultimate result, according to a 1987 study by the San Diego Association of Governments, is that housing prices will rise by $10,000 per
unit, and unemployment will increase by as much as two percentage
points.6 8 The inflation in housing prices is inevitable, says Sanford
Goodkin, a pro-growth advocate and consultant in San Diego, because of "continuing employment and natural population increases" 9-rising demand-in the face of a legally restricted supply.
Since housing is one of the basic durable goods traded within the
economy, the inflation of housing prices is likely to bring the general
increase in the inflation rate mentioned above. The evil twins of unemployment and inflation, finally thought conquered in the early
1980's, will be faced again as moratoria against future growth
spread throughout the country.
B.

Housing

Nowhere is this problem more acute than in the housing industry, where restrictions against further building will have their most
harmful social consequences. Growth controls, by turning residential
home sales into a seller's market and raising housing and rental
costs, are killing people's dreams of buying a home. According to a
1988 report by the National Housing Task Force, homeownership
for first time buyers "is becoming a fading dream as a result of high
real estate mortgages rates, rising home prices, and substantial
down- payment requirements.""0 In 1978, almost forty-five percent
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of all homeowners were between the ages of twenty-five and twentynine. Today, only slightly over thirty-five percent of young people in
this age group can afford to own a home - a ten percent drop in
only one decade.71 No-growth initiatives aimed at residential markets will only exacerbate this downward trend, serving to inflame
what is already a costly national crisis.
C.

Social Costs

Anti-development sentiment often has a high social cost as
well. 72 In many instances, no-growth initiatives espoused by the residents of wealthy, suburban communities mask a subtle but invidious
form of elitism and racism. By their very nature, slow-growth policies are prejudiced against future generations, who will have difficulty living in the costly communities that current residents are creating for their own benefit. Even worse, the economic distress caused
by slow growth in housing and other areas will leave future generations at greater risk to homelessness, unemployment, and a variety of
other social ills. This is reflected already in the declining homeownership rates of young people. By restricting growth, the nation loses
its capacity to accommodate future needs; the potential future costs
of anti-development sentiment-as of yet unmeasured-are tremendous.
Slow growth has elitist and racist overtones even in the present.
To critics of anti-development like Sanford Goodkin, moratoria and
similar measures amount to "little more than a thinly veiled effort by
affluent and largely white neighborhoods to exclude strangers while
boosting the value of their homes." 7 3 Goodkin claims that slowgrowth will hurt the less fortunate the most, cutting investment and
jobs in poorer neighborhoods where it can be least afforded.74 The
rising prices of homes in suburban areas caused by legal restrictions
on growth are clearly keeping moderate and low income groups from
living in these areas. This prevents the children of these parents from
"enjoying the benefits of the high quality educations found in most
suburbs. '' 75 By dividing communities through increasing costs along
71. Id. at 3.
72. See Case and Gale, Henry George Wouldn.t Be Big on Todays Growth Controls,
Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1988, at 16.
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class lines, anti-growth initiatives can only enhance social tension
and inequality-and it is clear that attitudes concerning growth are
a reflection of socio-economic status. According to the "1988 State
of the Neighborhoods Report" by the Citizens Committee for New
York City, only seven percent of leaders in low income neighborhoods thought there was too much development in the areas where
they lived; 62.2 percent said there was not enough. In high income
neighborhoods, 45.3 percent said there was too much development,
while only 6.6 percent said there was too little.7 6 Although this figure
undoubtedly reflects the fact that more development occurs in more
established areas, the municipal-wide restrictions that the well-off
enact against growth affect all citizens, hurting the chances for potential development that low income leaders perceive is badly
needed. By creating a gulf of perception and potential between income groups, anti-growth initiatives exact high social costs and hinder important national efforts at achieving the equality of opportunity Americans deserve as a right.
D.

Business Costs

An anti-development climate in a community imposes high costs
for businesses, as well as for would-be residents. Some business leaders and local officials worry that even mild growth restrictions can
chill an area's business climate by fostering the impression that "local government is out to soak corporations."" By increasing costs
and reducing choices for developers, anti-development movements
work to increase industrial and commercial rental rates and restrict
the choices of businesses as to where to operate. According to Andrew Reinbach in Barron's, this "threatens to send more businesses
scurrying to lower-cost suburbs ...undercutting urban tax revenues
and employment."178 It may drive marginal businesses with low profits out of operation completely. Clearly, anti-development initiatives
work to exacerbate the very trends that economic development entities like PDC are trying to reverse (e.g. declining urban manufacturing and employment bases, lowered market vitality and regional
leadership). For example, big development firms are already withdrawing from San Francisco markets, 79 and San Francisco will have
76.
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to begin thinking about how it competes economically with surrounding areas. Los Angeles' potential position as the capital of the burgeoning Pacific Rim economy may also be threatened by its lack of
interest in future development.8" An anti-development community is
also very much an anti-business community, at great cost to its residents in terms of its employment opportunities and tax base.
E.

Costs to the Development Community

Lastly, slow-growth initiatives are tremendously costly to the
development industry, a large and important sector in the national
economy. The irony of growth control is that it is often initiated by
citizen groups angered by the apparent size, wealth, and success of
developers operating in their communities. The result of growth control, however, produces exactly that which the activists resent: "real
estate markets characterized by soaring property values and a general bidding-up of the entry cost to downtown development that limit
the game to the big builders the most rabid no-growthers detest."81
No-growth activists perceive monoply profits being made in the development industry, but the cost and complexity of the restrictions
they impose only serve to consolidate the industry further, encouraging the massive profit of monoply that really does not exist in the
first place.82 Since it is not uncommon for a developer to spend two
years and hundreds of thousands of dollars before discovering
whether a project can even be initiated, only developers with ample
resources, strong commitment, and careful planning can survive in
an anti-growth environment.
It is clear, then, that what Anthony Downs in The National
Real Estate Investor calls the "politicization of real estate ' 83 favors
large developers who can spread overhead, utilize specialized staff,
and maintain backup resources. Mr. Downs further points out that it
is not really the small-scale developer who is hurt by no-growth, for
his projects are usually too small to attract community resistance or
come under moratoria or exactment guidelines. It is rather the middle sized developer who is squeezed out-the projects fall within the
scope and legal framework of anti-development initiatives, but he
himself is neither large nor specialized enough to withstand the cost
80.
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and delay anti-development brings. 84 Clearly, the loss of the development community's "middle class" is another of the costs of slowgrowth. The ideal development industry is one that is diverse, with
many areas of specification and expertise. Anti-growth works against
such a positive model for developers, and renders this essential segment of the economy less attractive and dynamic.
IV.

SOURCES OF ANTI-DEVELOPMENT SENTIMENT

We have looked at the various forms, new and old, that the
slow-growth movement is taking in the 1980's. We have also seen
the tremendous costs of anti-development. To understand antigrowth movements, however, we must also explore those factors
which have caused them to exist in the first place. Slow-growth is
exceptionally strong today because of the unique problems from
which the movement is derived; to understand these issues is to better understand the power of the argument that advocates of growth
are currently battling.
A.

Infrastructure Problems

Anti-development sentiment has arisen first and foremost from
the decay in infrastructure and the great stress it is currently under
from recent rapid growth. When infrastructure is strained, people
see new development as an enemy because new buildings can only
mean new burdens on public services. The Urban Land Institute Development Trends 1988 report notes: "The most fundamental rationale for controlling development in most communities . . . is coordinating the provision of infrastructure with development. It seems
that 'quality of life' for many people means maintenance of satisfactory levels of traffic movement, water supply, waste water treatment,
and other essential services."85 More than any other factor, the nation's strained infrastructure is creating a crisis for developers.
Infrastructure worries have hit both cities and suburbs, but it is
in the bedroom communities outside the central metropolitan core
that these worries have ignited most fiercely into anti-development
sentiment. Cities have long since been accustomed to strained infrastructure-and the exactment fees they impose are one attempt to
mitigate this continuing problem. Opponents of growth in urban areas continue to use infrastructure strain as a powerful example in
84.
85.
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arguing against future growth-it is a significantly valid concern
which promises to gain further credibility as cities continue to build
while relying on existing infrastructure. But for the suburbs these
problems are new and alarmingly regressive. Notes Larry Wofford:
"[m]any suburban communities are experiencing the very problems
that caused their residents to leave the cities . . . because the suburbs
are becoming cities as they mature.""0 Since the Second World War,
most of the nation's growth has occurred in suburban areas. While
the nation's population rose twenty-six percent between 1960 and
1980, the population in suburban areas nearly doubled."
The deterioration and decay of urban infrastructure serves as a
lesson for more suburban locales. Because suburbanites traditionally
loathe the population density reminiscent of city life, growth has occurred in an "urban sprawl" with new development pushing continually outward into once-rural areas, where infrastructure is lacking.88
This has created a "gap between the demand for public services and
their availability," notes Sharon Thomason in American City &
Country.8 9 The conflict over infrastructure has thus fueled anti-development sentiments in the suburbs far greater than in the cities,
where fundamental public services are at least available. This problem is only exacerbated by the fact that public works spending, instead of rising with population growth, has declined from twenty
percent of total government expenditure in 1950 to less that seven
percent in 1984.90 With less money available, the national infrastructure is worsening just as it is coming under higher demand.
Infrastructure troubles are diverse, and vary according to the
areas in which they are located. All, however, have lead to growth
moratoria and new limits on developers. In Florida, the school system is in a major crisis because of huge population growth. The state
estimates it must build 933 new schools by 1998 just to keep pace
with growth-but it is experiencing difficulty finding the money to
pay for a building program.9 1 The suburban counties of Atlanta Fulton, Gwinnett, and Cobb-all imposed development moratoria in
1986 because of insufficient sewer capacity. But the greatest expression of our national infrastructure problems is also the single factor
86.
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that has lead more people to become "anti-growthers" than any
other: traffic congestion. In many suburban areas like Orange
County, California, traffic is worse than it is in major cities.92 The
average rush hour freeway speeds in Orange County are currently
thirty-six mph; they are expected to plunge to an absurd ten mph
within the next twenty years.93 In general, while the number of cars
and trucks on American roads has increased sixty-three percent
since 1970, the total mileage of all streets and roads has increased
only five percent. 94 This gap has caused traffic congestion across the
nation. Because the roadways are a very obvious form of infrastructure whose inefficiencies are maddeningly frustrating, traffic congestion has proved a powerful impetus for implementing anti-growth
initiatives.
B. Federal Cutbacks
Another cause of the current wave of anti-development motions
is the cutbacks in the federal budget brought about by the Reagan
Administration. In the past, grants from Washington formed a major portion of municipal budgets for facilities and services. Under
Reagan, the share of city revenues from federal grants has dropped
from twenty-five percent of total budget to under ten percent today."9 City leaders, financially strapped by the loss of federal funds,
turned to developers profiting in the city environment as a source of
continued revenue. Thus, in a very direct way, the exactment fee was
born. 96 In Boston, the city lost $30 million for its low and middle
income housing program from Reagan cutbacks. 97 Its exactment fee
program provides funds for housing, but will contribute only $2.5
million a year-not nearly enough to cover the gap.98 Federal cutbacks, then, have hurt important programs that the private sector
cannot feasibly finance on its own. At the same time, they have burdened developers with added costs, thus contributing to the anti-development movement.
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Local Tax Limits

What the federal government has taken away, local governments have not been able to replace-this is another reason for the
spreading use of slow-growth initiatives. Jon D. Hull writes in Time:
"'[i]n part, California's slow-growth movement is a product of the
state's most celebrated previous initiative . . . [:]Proposition 13."19
Proposition 13 is a symbol of the anti-tax revolt which has been representative of American political life on both the national and local
levels in the 1980s. Voters on the local level, refusing to allow their
tax rates to rise, have as a consequence prevented localities from
spending money on the infrastructure improvements that might have
been able to accommodate tremendous recent growth. The result is
infrastructure strain, as well as the corresponding slow-growth initiatives and exactment fees which the development community is facing
today. Clearly, the governmental budget limitations of the past decade-both in the federal government and in municipalities-have
worked to hinder growth and make the process more costly for
developers.
D.

Activists

Another cause of slow-growth sentiment is the very activism
that supports it. Anti-growth initiatives do not simply happen. They
are presented to the public and forced on local governments by activists-often neighborhood groups representing the cause of
"NIMBY"-working in the community for the cause of the antidevelopment movement. Activists working in the 1960s have turned
their attention to the problems of urban areas, and have been arguing with great sophistication and political skill for the needs of the
poor and urban dwellers.'
Activists have played a large role around the country in the imposition of growth controls, pressing for exactions and mitigation
monies from developers. In Hartford, activists blocked highway 1-84
one rush-hour morning to protest the city's lenient growth policies;'
they have taken similar, if less dramatic, steps in cities across the
country to limit growth and make developers pay. Because slowgrowth is often a middle class battle cry, anti-growth activists are
typically well organized with considerable resources. In both the city
99. Hull, supra note 42, at 25.
100. Reinbach, supra note 17, at 81.
101. Waldman, supra note 22, at 25.
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and the suburbs, activists play a major role in passing slow-growth
initiatives, and are thus a major source of the anti-development
movement.

V.

THE NATURE OF GROWTH

The fundamental cause of the anti-growth movement, and one
which underlies the infrastructure problems discussed above, is the
very particular way America has grown since the Second World
War. As mentioned before, the majority of America's population and
economic growth has occurred in the suburbs, where infrastructure is
least able to handle it." 2 Christopher Leinberger in The Wall Street
Journal calls this recent growth "a radical transformation in the
structure and appearance of our metropolitan areas."' 10 3 It has been
carried out by business and the development community in a rapid
and uncoordinated way. Our cities no longer consist of central,
downtown business districts well connected by mass transit and highways to bedroom communities. Rather, most of our recent office,
commercial, and retail development has taken place in the suburbs
themselves.' °4
In Boston, for example, the downtown area in 1982 accounted
for just under seventy-five percent of the metropolitan area's office
space. In 1988, fifty-eight percent of the area's office space was located in the suburbs; clearly, the outskirts of the cities are booming
much faster than the downtowns. 06 In New York City, since 1985
over six million square feet of office space has been built or newly
renovated in the four boroughs outside of Manhattan - again indicating the growth occurring in the outskirts of central business
districts.
What we increasingly find today in our metropolitan areas is a
collection of interdependent "urban villages," with mini-downtowns
scattered throughout old suburban areas competing with each other
and the old central business district and other regions. Each of the
'village' focal points attracts its own businesses, stores, and commuters, in what Leinberger calls a "low-density cityscape."' '° Because
these villages are new and without public transit, the traffic in and
around them is intense. This, in turn, angers residents, who feel dis102.
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placed by the growth and the commuters, who must suffer with its
costs. This results in calls for the slowing of growth and the prevention of further development of other "urban villages." Thus, it is the
very way America has grown-pushing out into the country instead
of building up central areas already served with good infrastructure-that has caused our traffic woes, and in turn sparked calls for
slow-growth.
VI.

TRENDS IN ANTI-DEVELOPMENT

INITIATIVES

What is the future for developers in this slow-growth climate?
What trends can we expect from the anti-growth movement in the
future?
A.

Future Expansion

First and foremost, the use of anti-development moratoria and
exactions will spread, as the movement becomes a more important
and urgent voice in the nation's municipal political systems. Calls for
slowing growth are expected to spread further in the West to communities concerned with quality of life issues, and to the Northeast
and Midwest, where worries over strained infrastructure are great.1" 7
The trend, in short, is clearly toward greater public control of the
development process, with the public demanding a greater say in
what and where projects get built.
We can be so confident in saying that anti-development sentiment will spread because, in a real sense, it is inevitable. Within the
growth that has occurred in recent years are planted the seeds of the
anti-growth movement. America's suburban growth, as we have
seen, brings with it the traffic and infrastructure strain that lead as a
consequence to anti-growth sentiment. With the kind of growth we
have been having, anti-development initiatives are inevitable. But is
the resulting rapid expansion into new urban villages itself inevitable? If America is to keep growing, the answer is yes; the type of
growth we have embarked on is nearly inevitable, given our national
culture. The classic American dream keeps it so. Anthony Downs
notes that there are three "goals that suburban residents insist upon
pursuing, which inevitably generate traffic congestion." 1 8 First of
all, Americans demand to live at relatively low densities. This forces
a spreading out of housing and consequently necessitates considera107.
108.
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ble commutes to the work place and prevents the economically feasible use of mass transit. Americans also want a broad combination of
places to live and work, and to avoid choosing jobs or housing based
on commuting time. Lastly, as Downs points out, "American commuters overwhelmingly prefer to drive their own private cars to work
and back.""0 9 Low density housing, choice, and the private car as the
commuting vehicle: all encourage the growth of suburbs as workplaces as well as residences. These particularly American characteristics thus encourage the growth of the suburbs as collections of urban villages. As a consequence, they also encourage the traffic that
makes anti-growth sentiment spread. The very characteristic of
Americans as they relate to growth, reveals that the future can only
hold an expansion in the scope and severity of anti-development initiatives in the suburbs.
Although the suburbs face substantial opposition to growth,
anti-growth activism can only increase in the cities, too. The infrastructure burdens facing large municipalities are clearly immense.
Little new infrastructure can be added because of a sheer lack of
space, not to mention fiscal resources. The municipalities are also
criticized by groups who see all new building as adding painfully to
the congestion and density that characterizes the urban landscape.
Therefore, anti-development initiatives will continue to plague cities
as well.
B.

Legal Issues

Another trend to be considered is the continuing way in which
the law supports the efforts of anti-development activists. The courts
have traditionally protected a municipality's right to control and direct development within its borders, based on its right to zone. Two
June 1987 Supreme Court decisions appeared for some time to
threaten this right, to the benefit of mega-developers who prefer an
unfettered development climate. 10 It appears, however, that these
decisions have had little effect. Cities can continue to legally impose
development moratoria and exactment fees. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles," ' the court
ruled that property owners must be compensated for adverse consequences of regulations as these amounted in effect to governmental
109. Id.
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takings. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 12 the court
ruled that any conditions attached to a building permit must substantially advance a valid government purpose.11 3 These decisions
originally caused an initial flurry of optimism in the development
community, because they would force municipalities to consider the
costs to developers when imposing regulations. Expert legal advice,
however, has indicated they are too vague and confusingly written to
be of any real value." 4 As a result, it is business as usual for the
municipal agencies which administer growth controls.
C.

Renewed Commitment to Infrastructure Spending

There are renewed calls for a greater commitment to infrastructure spending surfacing across the country. Many states have accelerated programs for the repair and maintenance of decaying roads
and bridges. Additional toll roads are being considered in Southern
California as an answer to that area's traffic problems. Light Rail
Systems are being considered as feasible mass transit alternatives.
Many areas, such as the suburban counties of Atlanta, are spending
the money to provide for more roads, sewers, and similar projects. 5
A continuation and enhancement of these trends may, in the future,
solve some of the traffic and capacity problems which are such important sticking-points for anti-development advocates. On the other
hand, increasing infrastructure capacity may act as a vacuum, drawing in greater demand, solving nothing and serving only to create
more density. Whether infrastructure improvements can really reduce infrastructure strain remains an open question-it may even
prevent this alternative from becoming a viable solution to the antidevelopment problem.
D.

Wider-Scale and Density Planning

Another trend is that some states and counties are moving toward wider-scale planning and a systematization of development regulations. In 1987, Illinois, Tennessee, and Texas all adopted enabling
statutes which provide guidelines for municipalities in the imposition
of impact fees. By setting limits on fees and requiring municipalities
to have a clear case for the imposition of exactments, these statutes
112.
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provide that impact fees will be imposed "in a more uniform, equitable, and reasonable manner . . . .""' In 1985, Florida put teeth in
its ten year old state growth plan by threatening to withhold state
aid to localities not in compliance. It now requires local plans to be
approved by state officials, offering some measure of standardization
across the state.117 While exactments and local regulations will continue to be imposed, the systematization resulting from state legislation may avoid the costly project-by-project horse-trading and local
idiosyncracies that have represented the worst aspects of the antidevelopment issue. On the other hand, it threatens to remove from
the local level important planning decisions which can only be made
effectively there. Wide-scale planning has the potential of harming
the efforts of localities to address anti-growth concerns on their
merit. Standardizing the solution to such a complex, multifaceted
issue is by no means the answer.
Other areas are moving toward a partial solution to the
problems of suburban sprawl. Recall that the low-density growth of
the suburbs, loved by Americans as the single best way to achieve
the dream of individual homeownership, is exactly the factor which
leads to traffic congestion and anti-development sentiment. Boulder
County, Colorado adopted a regional plan, driven by a concern that
rapid growth and suburban sprawl were bringing inefficient consumption of public services (because of the great distances over
which development was occurring) and a dangerous encroachment
on open spaces. Boulder's plan, in response to the problem of sprawl,
encourages new growth in and around existing urban centers, where
infrastructure is in place and can be expanded. 11 8 Dade County,
Florida, recently adopted a plan which seeks to preserve important
agricultural land used for winter vegetable production.11 9 In essence,
this plan "contains" development, and is another example of a new
wave of regional "in-filling" policies. Seminole County, Florida, is
actually considering changing its zoning laws to allow for high- rises,
in order to avoid the costs of sprawl. 2 ' The plans represent nothing
less than an encouragement of density in the nation's suburban areas, and are thus a radical departure from the American tradition of
low-density development. Whether density planning can become
116.
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widely accepted in a country deeply antithetical to it remains an
open matter, but the trend does represent something of a solution to
the infrastructure crisis which is currently spurring strong anti-development initiatives.
E. Anti-growth Differential
Perhaps the most favorable trend for an institution like PDC is
the relatively greater strength of suburban anti-development initiatives. It is certainly true that both cities and suburbs are facing the
challenges of slow growth; the comprehensive restrictions enacted by
San Francisco indicate the power of anti-growth in downtown areas.
But it is also the case that slow-growth is a greaterproblem for suburbs than it is for cities, with the faster growth, more vociferous activism, greater lack of infrastructure, and more severe traffic
problems of cities. The result is that urban areas may find themselves relatively better off in an anti-development climate, and better
able to compete with the suburbs even as they suffer through slowgrowth initiatives themselves. The reason is simple: the suburbs suffer more. Joseph M. Egan, Jr., President of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, is strikingly supportive of this feeling
in a July 19, 1988 letter to PDC. He writes: "Anti-development in
the suburbs is inherently good for cities. If we can improve our efficiency to govern and manage our affairs in a coherent manner, we
will benefit."
An example close to home is the current debate in New Jersey
over the imposition of a state-wide growth plan. Neal R. Pierce
writes in New Jersey's County News: "[C]hoking on its own
growth[,] ...[New Jersey is] about to become the first major industrial state to embrace serious statewide land-use controls."12' 1 The
impetus for New Jersey's plan is typical: rising infrastructure costs,
traffic congestion, disappearing open spaces, and a general sense that
the state is losing the quality of life benefits which have proved so
attractive in wooing firms from New York City. It is supported, also
typically, by businessmen, environmentalists, and politicians across
the political spectrum. 22 By withdrawing state support for infrastructure enhancement in areas not approved for development, the
proposal encourages density and focuses growth into urban centers
121. Peirce, Strangling on Success, N.J. Looks at Unprecedented Growth Controls,
County News, May 16, 1988, at 18.
122. See id.
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while stressing conservation in rural areas.1 2
In all these ways, New Jersey's slow-growth proposal is typical
of many other such plans throughout the country. Also typically, the
plan has proved extraordinarily controversial, and has outraged city
officials and landowners who find it ignorant of economic realities
and demographics. 24 This is somewhat to the benefit of New York
City. The restrictions will raise the cost of development in New
Jersey, and reduce the choices of available space. This, along with
the acrimonious and uncertain political atmosphere the plan has created, will provide powerful disincentives to firms looking to move to
New Jersey from New York. However, New Jersey's problems
should not be taken as an indication that New York is "doing fine"
in terms of facing anti-development sentiment; this will not be New
York's automatic ticket out of the slow-growth problem. The city
still faces the massive problems of strained infrastructure and vehement citizen opposition to growth. The problems of New Jersey may
provide a boost to New York's economic development efforts, but
they will not solve the endemic problems PDC faces in fostering development within the city. The fact that the problem exists more severely in other areas does not make the problem go away in a city
such as New York-it merely illustrates the scope of the problem.
F. Possible Solutions
It is clear, then, that the future of anti-growth measures shows
a continued increase in their use and severity, even as some steps are
taken to mitigate their harshest consequences for cities and other
areas. What more can be done to ease anti-development efforts and
recommit the nation to growth? The outlook here is not particularly
bright-there are no easy cures. Many solutions that do exist are
wholly unpalatable. A recession, for instance, would put a halt to
anti-development movements by stopping growth, but this solution is
clearly worse than the problem.
1. Improved Communication
One factor which has real potential for mitigating the antigrowth movement is for developers to learn to better communicate
with local governments and the surrounding communities. Many developers have traditionally failed to determine public sentiment
123.
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before going ahead with projects, and have likewise failed to educate
the public when a project is up for approval. Bernard Ury, a Chicago
public relations executive, suggests that "by spending time and
money up front in doing a better job of sounding out and then accommodating public sentiment, real estate developers probably could
accomplish more in less time and at less cost - and create goodwill
in the bargain."' 12 5 As a corollary, developers must also establish
stronger ties with the local agencies who have the power to grant
permission for a proposed development. 2 Developers who are responsible community citizens often have the advantage in getting
through the regulatory maze; one reason the firm Hires Interests was
granted a permit to build in San Francisco's strictly controlled market was because it had a responsible reputation in the city.12 7 Learning to reason with the anti-growth sympathies of public and government will not make the slow-growth movement go away. But it will
reduce potential costs for developers by ensuring timeliness and predictability, thus mitigating the adverse economic consequences of
anti-development.
2.

Increased Infrastructure Spending

Another potential solution to the anti-growth problem is for the
United States to more fully and actively commit itself to an improvement of its infrastructure, especially the highway system. By matching infrastructure spending to the pace of development, the nation
may reduce the strain on infrastructure that is the cause of so much
anti-development sentiment. In an age of fiscal austerity in localities
and huge deficits in the federal budget, finding money for such a
program may be next to impossible. Not all improvements require
huge capital outlays, however. By encouraging voluntary programs
to reduce traffic congestion (like staggered work hours), and utilizing
emerging computer technologies which can efficiently regulate traffic
flows, the frustrations of rush hour can be reduced without spending
large sums of limited public monies. As we noted before, however,
this solution may backfire and turn out to be no solution at all. Increasing infrastructure spending may only serve to increase demand
and thus maintain congestion, leaving a lot of public money spent for
little benefit.
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Cities vs. Suburbs

In the end, however, infrastructure enhancement may do little
to mitigate anti-development sentiment in the suburbs. Even with
good roads and civic-minded developers, suburban Americans increasingly dislike the urban sprawl which encroaches on open areas.
They are likewise resistant to density building. Since development
can only occur up or out, suburbs may be forced to face slow-growth
measures in the forseeable future, condemned to do so by the very
largesse they have so swiftly achieved. There is very little that can
change the forms our suburban areas are taking. It is these forms
themselves which incite residents to work against growth. As such,
there really is no cure for slow-growth movements in the suburbs.
The cities lack the fundamental problem of a public abhorrence
of densities, since it already exists. City governments can encourage
developers to be responsible citizens, and make some attempt at improving their infrastructures (which may or may not work). In doing
so, and in taking advantage of the beneficial differential between city
and suburban anti-growth movements, cities may be able to meet the
challenge of growth controllers better than suburbs. This may be
feasible if they can overcome the other problems they face in this
issue-a highly activist citizenry, resentment at infilling practices,
and similar problems. That they can overcome these problems is by
no means guaranteed.
CONCLUSION

To sum up, we have seen how traditional slow-growth agendas-those of preservationists and environmentalists in particular-are challenging the development community in new and expanded ways. We have also reviewed the new types of antidevelopment initiatives-exactment fees, moratoria, legal restrictions, and the like. All of these, we noted, were brought on by an
increasingly politicized and activist citizenry angry at the apparent
costs of new growth. We have looked into the tremendous costs of
slow-growth: spiraling unemployment and inflation, a shortage of affordable housing, social dislocation and elitism, a loss of community
economic leadership, and lastly, a development industry in which the
middle sized firm is finding it increasingly difficult to compete. We
have examined the sources of anti-development sentiment: infrastructure and traffic woes, federal spending cutbacks, limits on local
tax increases, citizen activism, and, most importantly, the sprawling
character our suburbs are assuming because of America's love of
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low-density living. We have noted that, in the future, anti-growth
initiatives will continue to spread because of the very nature of recent suburban growth and the continuing problems of urban life, and
that the legal support for "anti-growthers" will continue to be
strong. We can expect new calls for more infrastructure spending, a
greater commitment to wide-scale density-oriented planning, and a
relative boost to cities from the "anti-growth differential," whereby
suburbs suffer under more anti-development sentiment than cities.
Finally, we have seen that the cures for anti-development sentiment
are limited; developers must learn to communicate better, and governments may wish to recommit themselves to infrastructure spending. Everywhere, anti-development initiative will remain powerful
challenges to a pro-growth agenda.
Finally, then, two points need to be expressed. It is clear that
the slow-growth movement ultimately derives from the economic
boom which has spread across the country in the last decade. In a
real sense, the challenge of anti-development must be approached
with optimism. The slow-growth movement, coming from economic
expansion, is first and foremost a problem of surplus, a problem of a
vital and expanding economy. It is, after all, not a bad problem for
the development community to face, if one must be faced at all. Better anti-development than its opposite - no development whatsoever. Secondly, anti-development is a very new problem, having only
built up steam in the past three years or so. America has not yet felt
its full costs or affects; its ultimate consequences for our communities lies in the future, and cannot yet be fully assessed.
We can end by prescribing a new mission for a pro-development
agenda: the development community needs to make a better and
more convincing argument for growth, reminding America that its
history and tradition have been guided by a concern for continued
development. Since growth is the essence of progress, the development community needs also to remind the nation that its future lies
only as its past has directed it: in a continually renewed commitment
to the growth and development which have always sustained and improved us.

